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I. INTRODUCTION
"Of the many fine lines that run through the Copyright Act, none is
more troublesome than the line between protectible pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works and unprotectible utilitarian elements of industrial design."'
As this statement suggests, the copyrightability of products of industrial
design is one of the most confusing aspects of American copyright law. For
these works, availability of protection turns on a doctrine known as
"separability." Countless everyday objects have been analyzed under the
separability doctrine, including belt buckles, casino uniforms, and mannequin
heads, just to name a few.2 The United States Copyright Act (hereinafter
"Copyright Act") classifies such objects as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
("PGS") works.3 PGS works constitute a very significant category of
copyrightable material; 90,749 of the 509,746 basic copyright registrations in
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2006, were for PGS works.4 This Note
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the character-building task (to avoid a more colorful description) of editing this Note. All
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1 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.5.3, at 99
(1989).
2 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (belt
buckle); Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005) (casino
uniform); Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004)
(mannequin head).
3 PGS works "include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine,
graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts,
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2000).
4 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 63
(2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2006/index.html. In its
breakdown of types of registered works, the Report does not use the label "PGS works,"
but instead uses the label "[w]orks of the visual arts, including two-dimensional works of
fine and graphic art, sculptural works, technical drawings and models, photographs,
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discusses the separability requirement, which courts use to determine
whether the design of a useful article qualifies as a protectible PGS work.5
A determination of separability, either physical or conceptual, is a
prerequisite to copyright protection for the design of a useful article.6 In its
statutory form, the separability inquiry asks whether the aesthetic features of
a useful article can be identified separately from, and can exist independently
of, the work's utilitarian functions. 7 Soon after the Copyright Act of 1976
took effect, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit began
developing the conceptual separability doctrine. Over the course of several
years, the Second Circuit formulated a standard for conceptual separability,
although, as discussed below, even that circuit found it difficult to apply.8
Then, over twenty-five years after the 1976 Act took effect, the conceptual
separability doctrine again made waves in the intellectual property law
community. 9 The resurgence of the doctrine began in 2004 with Pivot Point
International v. Charlene Products, Inc. 10 In Pivot Point, the Seventh Circuit
applied the Second Circuit's test and determined that the design of a
mannequin head meant to depict a fashion model satisfied conceptual
separability because the designer's judgment was unaffected by functional
concerns.11 The following year, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in
cartographic works[,] commercial prints and labels, and works of applied arts." As of
publication, the fiscal year 2006 data was the most current information available.
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (indicating that useful articles are only copyrightable if
they meet the separability requirement). Section 101 defines a useful article as "an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information."
6 See, e.g., I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2.08[B][3] (2000) [hereinafter NIMMER]; Raymond M. Polakovic, Comment, Should
the Bauhaus Be in the Copyright Doghouse? Rethinking Conceptual Separability, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 871, 874 (1993) ("in determining whether a useful article should be
copyrightable, the court must decide whether the artistic element of the article is
separable from its utilitarian application.").
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("[T]he design of a useful article... shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of
the article.").
8 See Part IIl.E, infra.
9 See Mannequin Head Depicting "Hungry Look" High-Fashion Runway Model is
Protected by Copyright, After All, Federal Appellate Court Rules, ENTERTAINMENT LAW
REPORTER, Nov. 2004, at 18 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's decision in Pivot Point).
10 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004).
11 Id. at 931.
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Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., 12 holding that creatively designed casino
uniforms failed to satisfy the conceptual separability requirement. 13 It did so,
however, by applying a very different test from the one adopted by the
Seventh Circuit in Pivot Point, focusing on the marketability of the uniforms
absent their utilitarian function. 14 Thus, separability has caused conflict
among circuits even twenty-five years after Congress codified the doctrine.
This suggests that the currently available tests are both confusing and unable
to effectively determine the copyrightability of useful articles.
It is impossible to deny the importance of the separability doctrine. It
implicates both industrial design (sometimes referred to as applied art) and
fashion design. 15 The categories of works subject to separability analysis are
vast; courts have applied the doctrine to determine the copyrightability of the
designs of a variety of everyday objects, including furniture, 16 shoes, 17 and
objects of entertainment for both children 18 and adults.1 9 Thus, the
separability doctrine enjoys widespread application to countless products that
directly affect people's day-to-day lives. Given this fact, and given the very
recent split between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, separability is still "alive
and well," to borrow a phrase from Judge Oakes of the Brandir court.20
12 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005).
13Id. at 418.
14 Compare Galiano, 416 F.3d at 422 (finding a lack of separability because the
plaintiffs uniform designs were not "marketable independently of their utilitarian
function") with Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 932 (finding separability because plaintiff's
mannequin head was "the product of a creative process unfettered by functional
concerns").
15 See generally Mark A. LoBello, The Dichotomy between Artistic Expression and
Industrial Design: To Protect or not to Protect, 13 WHITTIER L. REv. 107 (1992);
Jennifer Mencken, A Design for the Copyright of Fashion, 1997 B.C. INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. F. 121201 (1997).
16 Universal Furniture Int'l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 196 F.App'x 166,
171 (4th Cir. 2006) (refusing to reverse the district court's finding that furniture design
was not copyrightable because it did not meet the separability requirement).
17 Elya, Inc. v. Kohl's Dept. Stores, No. 06 Civ 195 (GEL), 2006 WL 2645196,
*1099 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2006) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss copyright
infringement claim because shoe design did not meet separability requirement).
18 Spinmaster, Ltd. v. Overbreak LLC, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (N.D. I11. 2005)
(granting preliminary injunction because aesthetic features of flying saucer toy were
separable from utilitarian functions).
19 ConWest Res., Inc. v. Playtime Novelties, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1019, 1023-24,
1028 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2006) (denying preliminary injunction because aesthetic
features of sculptures of a body part were not separable from utilitarian functions).
20 Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144 (2d Cir.
1987) (noting that conceptual separability is "alive and well" in the Second Circuit).
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though its application (and accompanying confusion) has spread well beyond
the Second Circuit. This Note explores the development of the various
conceptual separability tests that courts and commentators have offered and
discusses their respective strengths and weaknesses.
Because the currently available tests do not adequately serve the
purposes of the separability doctrine and copyright law, this Note proposes
an alternative balancing test. It directs courts to balance 1) the degree to
which the designer of a useful article is influenced by aesthetic
considerations, as opposed to functional ones, when designing the article, and
2) the degree to which the design of the useful article is dictated by its
utilitarian function. As discussed below, the proposed balancing test is better
than the currently available tests for two reasons. First, the test allows the
conceptual separability determination to turn on only the subjective and
objective elements of the design process. This limited focus ensures that the
inquiry is not influenced by judges' or mainstream consumers' biases about
the nature of art. Second, the test ensures that copyright protection is more
predictable. If designers can feel confident in advance that their works will
receive copyright protection, they will be more likely to create artistically-
influenced useful articles, which benefits the public by ensuring that a wide
variety of designs for useful articles is available.
Part II of this Note provides background by explaining the definitions of
PGS works and useful articles. Part III discusses the development of the
separability doctrine, beginning with the doctrine's origins before the
adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976. It then addresses the evolution of
conceptual separability after the 1976 Act took effect, focusing on the rich
history of conceptual separability in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, as well as the recent conflicting decisions of the Seventh
and Fifth Circuits. Part IV summarizes the five major conceptual separability
tests that courts and commentators have articulated. It proceeds to discuss the
shortcomings of the currently available tests. Finally, Part V of this Note
proposes the alternative two-factor balancing test for conceptual separability,
which directs courts to balance 1) the degree to which the designer of a
useful article is influenced by aesthetic considerations, as opposed to
functional ones, when designing the article, and 2) the degree to which the
design of the useful article is dictated by its utilitarian function.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SEPARABILITY DOCTRINE AND
THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Before venturing into a detailed analysis of conceptual separability, some
background information is necessary. Therefore, this Part discusses the
definitions in the Copyright Act that are most relevant to an analysis of
conceptual separability. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power
[Vol. 69:109
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"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 21 Pursuant to its Copyright Clause power,
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Copyright Act" or "Act"). 22
The Copyright Act sets forth several definitions, including those that have
generated the confusion addressed by this Note.
Section 102 of the Act defines generally the scope of copyright law. It
provides that copyright protection subsists "in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression . -23 It then gives a non-
exhaustive list of categories of "works of authorship," which includes
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." 24 Thus, under the explicit terms of
the Copyright Act, PGS works are eligible for copyright protection.
Section 101 of the Act defines PGS works. The first part of the definition
provides a non-exhaustive list of types of works that fall within the category.
It includes "two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic,
and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes,
charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural
plans."25
For purposes of this Note, the second part of the definition of PGS works
is more important because it provides the statutory basis for the separability
requirement.26 It first says that "works of artistic craftsmanship" are PGS
works (and thus copyrightable) only "insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned. ''27 It then provides that "the
design of a useful article" is only a PGS work if its PGS features are
identifiable "separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article." 28 It is this language that has given rise to
21 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2000 & Supp. 2004). The 1976 Act is not the first
Copyright Act; the most notable previous version was the 1976 Act's predecessor, the
Copyright Act of 1909. However, because the differing applications of the separability
doctrine developed primarily after the adoption of the 1976 Act, this Note will discuss
only the relevant provisions of the 1976 Act.
23 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
24 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2000).
25 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
26 See Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1341,
1345 (1987) (noting the role of the definition in imbedding the separability test in the
Copyright Act).
27 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
28 Id. The full text of the provision reads as follows:
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three-
dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art
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the separability doctrine.
The definition of PGS works provides a cross-reference to the § 101
definition of a useful article. A useful article is "an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article
or to convey information." 29 Examples of useful articles include decorative
belt buckles,30 elaborate bicycle racks, 31 ornate lighting fixtures, 32 and board
games.33
The Copyright Act's definitions of PGS works and useful articles
essentially mandate a three-step inquiry for courts in trying to determine
whether a work is copyrightable. First, the court must determine if the work
satisfies the first part of the definition of a PGS work in § 101. Second, if it
does, it is potentially a PGS work and the court must then consider whether
the work meets the § 101 definition of a useful article. 34 Third, if the work is
a useful article, the court must determine if the work satisfies the second part
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings,
including architectural plans. Such works shall include works of artistic
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if and only to the extent
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of the
utilitarian aspects of the article.
Id. (emphasis added).
29 Id. A prior Copyright Office regulation had implemented an analysis similar to
separability if an article's "sole intrinsic function [was] its utility." 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c)
(1959) (emphasis added). For a discussion suggesting that the 1976 Act's use of the
phrase "having an intrinsic utilitarian function" could allow more works to qualify for
protection, see Melville B. Nimmer, The Subject Matter of Copyright Under the Act of
1976, 24 UCLA L. REV. 978, 1002 (1977).
30 See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 991-92 (2d Cir.
1980) (decorative belt buckles useful article but design still copyrightable).
31 See Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir.
1987) ("RIBBON" bicycle rack useful article and not copyrightable).
32 See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (ornate lighting
fixture useful article and not copyrightable).
33 Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 915 (2d Cir. 1980) (board
game useful article and not copyrightable). But c.f Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703
F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that. a toy airplane is not a useful article because,
while it is meant to be played with, its function is to portray a real airplane).
34 If the work is not a useful article, then it is not subject to the separability
requirement and is thus copyrightable subject to requirements of originality and fixation,
the Copyright Act's generally applicable prerequisites for protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2000).
[Vol. 69:109
CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY
of the § 101 PGS works definition, the separability requirement. 35 If the
work satisfies all three of these inquiries, it is a PGS work and the work's
non-utilitarian features can receive copyright protection. Framed this way,
the copyrightability of useful articles does not seem like a particularly
difficult concept. However, as the next Part of this Note will demonstrate,
judicial development of the separability doctrine has been anything but
simple.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEPARABILITY DOCTRINE
IN THE COURTS
The Copyright Act does not give courts much guidance in determining
whether a work meets the separability requirement. 36 As demonstrated by the
discussion that follows, this lack of guidance has caused courts great
difficulty in developing a test for separability. Subpart A contains a
discussion of Mazer v. Stein, a Supreme Court decision that predates the
1976 Act, and the subsequent regulation promulgated by the U.S. Copyright
Office (hereinafter "Copyright Office"). Subpart B discusses Esquire Inc. v.
Ringer, a case decided by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1978,
the year the 1976 Act took effect. Subparts C and D explain physical and
conceptual separability, respectively. These are the two different types of
separability that can satisfy the statutory requirement. As shown in subpart
D, the House Report accompanying the 1976 Act indicates that separability
can be accomplished either physically or conceptually. Subpart E addresses
Conceptual Separability's evolution in the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Finally, subparts F and G discuss the recent inconsistent applications
of conceptual separability in the Seventh and Fifth Circuits in Pivot Point
and Galiano, respectively.
A. Mazer v. Stein and its Aftermath
The Supreme Court of the United States decided Mazer v. Stein37 in
1954. While decided well before the adoption of the 1976 Act, Mazer is
essential to any discussion of separability because the 1976 Act essentially
codified the holding in Mazer.38 In Mazer, the respondents (the plaintiffs in
35 See Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 974 ("This [separability] provision applies only to
items that are first, as a whole, disallowed copyright protection as 'useful articles .... '").
36 The Act's lack of clarity on this point is quite significant in the field of copyright
law. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, and accompanying text.
37 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
38 See NIMMER, supra note 6, (noting that the holding in Mazer v. Stein has been
expressly adopted by the Copyright Act of 1976).
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the district court) manufactured and sold lamps. 39 One of them created
original sculptures of dancing men and women.40 The respondents
successfully registered the statuettes, without any lamp components added,
with the Copyright Office as "works of art" under the Copyright Act of
1909. 4 1 They sold the statuettes throughout the United States, both as lamp
bases and as statuettes on their own, though sale as lamp bases constituted all
but an insignificant portion of the sales.42 The petitioners (defendants), who
were also lamp manufacturers, copied the statuettes and sold them as lamp
bases. 43 The Supreme Court concluded that the statuettes were eligible for
copyright protection.44 In doing so, the Court rejected the petitioner's
argument that enactment of the design patent laws denies protection to
artistic articles embodied in manufactured articles. 45 It held that the statuettes
39 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202. It seems that decorative lighting fixtures serve as
excellent examples of useful articles, as they have been the object of copyright litigation
on several occasions. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(discussed in II.B, infra); see also Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345
F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003) (lamp not copyrightable because, among other reasons,
plaintiff did not design any separable features); Smith & Hawken, Ltd. v. Gardendance,
Inc., No. C 04-1664 SBA, 2005 WL 1806369, *4 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2005) (garden torch
not copyrightable because aesthetic features not separable from functional aspects).
40 Id. The female statuette consisted of a dancer in a floor length skirt with her right
leg crossed over her left, her left arm reaching up behind her head and her right arm
reaching down behind her back. Unfortunately, such a cursory written description
probably fails to convey the aesthetic value of the statuette-turned-lamp-base. Thankfully,
a photograph is available at Cool Copyright, http://www.coolcopyright.com/cases/chp4/
mazerstein.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
41 See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202-03. For a brief practical discussion of the benefits of
copyright registration, see Lara Pearson, When Use Alone Just Isn't Enough: The Benefits
of Federally Registering Trademarks & Copyrights, NEv. LAW., Dec. 2002, at 15, 16. For
a more in-depth exploration of the procedures and incentives associated with registration,
see Moses Bracey, Searching for Substance in the Midst of Formality: Copyright
Registration as a Condition Precedent to the Exercise of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction by
Federal Courts over Copyright Infringement Claims, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 111, 120-23
(2006).
42 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 203.
43 Id. The petitioners in Mazer were not the only designers who copied the
respondents' designs; the Court noted that the respondents had brought a series of
infringement suits against various defendants. Id at 203 n.2.
44 See id. at 214.
45 See id. at 215-16. The Court summarized petitioners' argument:
[C]ongressional enactment of the design patent laws should be interpreted as
denying protection to artistic articles embodied or reproduced in manufactured
articles....
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could be copyrighted regardless of patentability.46 The Court also explained
that the use or intended use of the statuettes in lamp bases did not bar their
subsequent registration as copyrightable works of art.4 7 Finally, the Court
approved of a Copyright Office regulation that allowed protection as works
of art for "works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned. 48
Mazer, to an extent, paved the way for the separability doctrine and the
cases applying it. The holding, including the Court's approval of the
regulation, suggests that the Court believed that useful articles are
copyrightable despite their utilitarian features. 49 After Mazer, the Copyright
Office promulgated a new regulation to implement the holding. 50 This
regulation, which contains some language eventually adopted in Congress's
definition of PGS works in the 1976 Act, still failed to draw a clear line for
copyright protection of useful articles.
5 1
If an industrial designer can not satisfy the novelty requirements of the design
patent laws, then his design as used on articles of manufacture can be copied by
anyone.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
4 6 Id. at 217 ("[T]he patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does
not bar copyright as works of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that
because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted.").
47 See id. at 218. Note that "works of art" was a category of protectible works under
the 1909 Act, which was in effect at the time of the Mazer decision. Articles classified as
"works of art" under the 1909 Act included works of applied art and industrial design;
such works now fall into the broader category of PGS works under the 1976 Act. See
Melville B. Nimmer, The Subject Matter of Copyright Under the Act of 1976, 24 UCLA
L. REV. 978, 998 (1977).
48 See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 212-13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949)).
49 See NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.08[B][3] ("The Mazer opinion can be read to
mean that any useful article, at least if it is aesthetically pleasing in appearance, is subject
to copyright protection with respect to its form.").
50 Id. The regulation provided:
If the sole function of an article is utility, the fact that it is unique and
attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a
utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial
representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of existing
independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c), 24 Fed. Reg. 4955, 4958 (1959).
51 See NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.08[B][3] ("[T]his Regulation too offered no
ready answer to the linedrawing problem inherent in delineating the extent of copyright
protection available for works of applied art.").
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B. Esquire: Application of the Post-Mazer Regulation
The regulation promulgated after Mazer was at issue in Esquire, Inc. v.
Ringer.52 In Esquire, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considered
whether the Register of Copyrights had acted appropriately in denying the
registration application for Esquire's "artistic design[s] for lighting
fixture[s]. ' '53 The articles at issue were "outdoor luminaries or floodlights, of
contemporary design, with rounded or elliptically-shaped housings. '54 The
district court had ruled in favor of Esquire, concluding that Mazer compelled
the Register to accept the registration. 55 To deny Esquire's application in the
light of upholding the issuance of the copyrights in Mazer would, according
to the district court, give "certain copyright privileges to traditional works of
art, but not to abstract, modem art forms." 56
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Register had adopted a
reasonable interpretation of the post-Mazer regulation.57 The Register
interpreted the regulation "to bar copyright registration of the overall shape
or configuration of a utilitarian article, no matter how aesthetically pleasing
that shape or configuration may be." s58 The Court rejected Esquire's
interpretation that the regulation allowed registration for the shape or design
of utilitarian articles if they were original and creative.59
It is not entirely clear from Esquire how far the D.C. Circuit would have
allowed the Register to go in interpreting the regulation. It is also not clear
how far the Register would have gone. After all, the second sentence of the
regulation explicitly contemplates protection for some features of utilitarian
52 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
53 Id. at 798.
54 Id. The court noted that Esquire's more detailed description indicated that:
[T]he lighting fixtures are provided with decorative housings having two
different styles of artistic configuration. The ELLIPTRA I and ELLIPTRA II
fixtures include oblate housings having a rounded upper portion, a cylindrical band
between the upper and lower portions, and a cylindrical lower edge portion. The
ELLIPTRA III design utilizes a generally cupshaped housing having a generally
elliptical cross section tapering into a rounded rear portion.
Id. at 798 n.2 (internal citation omitted). A photograph of a representative fixture appears
in CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 192 (6th ed. 2003, reprint 2005).
55 See Esquire, 591 F.2d at 799.
56 Id.
5 7 Id. at 800.
581Id.
59 See id. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals referred to the 1976 Act and
its legislative history despite the fact that the lighting fixtures were created before the
applicable date of the 1976 Act (and were thus subject to the 1909 Act). See id.
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articles. 60 Perhaps the problem for Esquire was that its artistic creation
served as the lamp housing itself.61 In Mazer, on the other hand, the artistic
creation was a statuette combined with a lamp base.62 However, relying on
this distinction to justify the different outcomes of the two cases certainly
seems to allow judges to make determinations based on their own subjective
opinions of what is "art."'63 After all, the facts of both cases boil down to a
lighting manufacturer designing uniquely shaped fixtures. The only real
difference is that the designer in Mazer physically joined an artistic element
to a functional one, while in Esquire, the artistic element was itself
functional.
One would hope that Congress would resolve the difficulties surrounding
separability when it adopted the 1976 Act. Unfortunately, as discussed
below, this was not the case. Congress only partially succeeded in its goal of
drawing a clear line to determine the copyrightability of useful articles. 64
C. The Simple but Harsh: Physical Separability
One formulation of the separability requirement is "physical
separability." Courts that have invoked this doctrine have said that an
aesthetic feature in a PGS work is copyrightable if it can be physically
separated without reducing the utility of the article and if the aesthetic feature
can, on its own, serve as a traditional work of art.65 Thus, an eagle sculpture
welded to a lighting fixture would be physically separable from the lighting
fixture (the eagle sculpture being the PGS feature and the lighting fixture
being the useful article).66 Assuming the eagle sculpture meets the originality
60 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c), 29 Fed. Reg. 4955, 4958 (1959) ("However, if the shape of
a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial
representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of existing
independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.").
61 See Esquire, 591 F.2d at 798 n.2 (describing the lighting fixtures).
62 See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 203.
63 See Eric Setliff, Copyright and Industrial Design: An "'Alternative Design"
Alternative, 30 COLuM. J.L. & ARTs 49, 52 (2006) (arguing that various articulations of
the separability doctrine all result in line drawing that reflects each court's subjective
opinions of what constitutes art, thus causing unpredictable and unfair outcomes).
64 See John B. Fowles, The Utility of a Bright-Line Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing
Judges from Aesthetic Controversy and Conceptual Separability in Leicester v. Warner
Bros., 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 301, 310 (noting that, after Congress passed the 1976 Act,
some courts adopted a relatively straightforward "physical separability" test while others
promulgated several different common-law "conceptual separability" tests).
65 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 106.
6 6 Id.
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requirement, 67 it would be protectible, though the lighting fixture would not.
Physical separability on its face seems relatively easy to apply. However,
on its own, it can lead to arbitrary distinctions, such as the one in Esquire.68
It is easy to see how seemingly insignificant changes in a fact pattern could
lead to an opposite result under this test. Suppose that a court today would
apply physical separability to the works at issue in Mazer. If the facts were
the same (the plaintiff designs the statuette separately and then incorporates it
into the lamp base), the statuette seems to pass the physical separability test.
If the plaintiff instead makes the statuette the lamp base itself (perhaps by
putting wiring through the body of the dancer and including a recessed lamp
socket in the top of the dancer's head), a court might find that the statuette is
not protectible because it is not physically separable from the useful article.
This is a troubling result, as the statuette is no less artistically designed
simply because it doubles as a lamp base. 69 Thus, while physical separability
is simple, it suffers from the arbitrary distinctions it can create. 70 Perhaps it is
for this reason that conceptual separability developed.71
D. The Complex but Flexible: Conceptual Separability
Upon examining § 101 of the 1976 Act, one will notice that the words
"physical" and "conceptual" do not appear in the definition of PGS works. 72
Rather, these terms derive from the legislative history accompanying the
Copyright Act. The House Committee on the Judiciary explained that the
design of an industrial product would not be copyrightable under the 1976
Act unless it "contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be
identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article. ''73
67 Originality is one of the two basic prerequisites for copyright protection; the other
is fixation. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (indicating that protection subsists in "original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... ). For a discussion of
these requirements, see NIMMER, supra note 6, §§ 2.01 (originality), 2.03[B] (fixation).
68 For example, under the physical separability test, the Esquire plaintiff would have
prevailed if it had designed its fixture housing separately and then welded it to a
preexisting lighting fixture. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 107.
69 Indeed, such a result would seem to conflict with Mazer's holding that a work is
copyrightable even if the creator intends it to possess utilitarian functions. See Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201,218 (1954).
70 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 107.
71 Id. (suggesting that the legislative history of the 1976 Act introduced conceptual
separability to avoid the arbitrary distinctions created by physical separability).
72 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
73 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976). The full paragraph containing the quoted
language reads:
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Importantly, the language of the House Report suggests that PGS
elements of a useful article can receive copyright protection even if they are
only conceptually, but not physically, separable. 74 The notion of copyright
protection for works that possessed only conceptual separability became
quite important, especially in the Second Circuit. It was there that the issue of
conceptual separability received the most detailed analysis in three
particularly important cases. 75
E. The Second Circuit: The Home of Conceptual Separability
There are three major conceptual separability cases in the Second
Circuit: Kieselstein-Cord, Carol Barnhart, and Brandir. Together, these
three cases represent an in-depth exploration of the conceptual separability
doctrine and an ambitious attempt to develop an effective test over several
years. Unfortunately, as indicated by the fact that different circuits are still in
disagreement about the test for conceptual separability, the efforts of the
Second Circuit have served as the beginning of the debate, not the end.
The first noteworthy case in the Second Circuit involved ornate belt
buckles. 76 In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., the plaintiff
(Kieselstein-Cord) designed the buckles from original renderings he had
In adopting this amendatory language, the Committee is seeking to draw as
clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and
uncopyrighted works of industrial design. A two-dimensional painting, drawing, or
graphic work is still capable of being identified as such when it is printed on or
applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and the
like. The same is true when a statute [sic] or carving is used to embellish an
industrial product or, as in the Mazer case, is incorporated into a product without
losing its ability to exist independently as a work of art. On the other hand, although
the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the
Committee's intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless
the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or
any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or conceptually,
can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design
would not be copyrighted under the bill.
Id. As will be demonstrated below, the Committee failed in its goal "to draw as clear a
line as possible," at least to the extent one believes that inconsistency among the courts
indicates failure to draw a clear line.
74 See Shim Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of
Useful Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 339, 351 (noting that language allowing
for protection of articles that are conceptually but not physically separable "opened new
vistas of protection, blurring the dividing line between art and non-art, and set the stage
for subsequent analysis.").
75 See id. at 358.
76 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 990 (2d Cir. 1980).
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conceived and sketched. 77 The buckles each contained rounded comers,
sculpted surfaces, several surface levels, and rectangular cut-outs at one end
for the belt attachment. 78 One of the buckles, the Winchester model,
experienced great commercial success; the plaintiff sold it in both men's and
women's sizes in silver and gold, and in a smaller size to be worn around the
neck or elsewhere on the body besides the waist.79 Both the Winchester and
Vaquero models were donated by the plaintiff and accepted into the
permanent collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.8°
The defendant made exact copies of the plaintiffs buckles but used
common metal instead of precious metal.81 Thus, the only issues were
whether the buckles could be protected by copyright and whether the
copyrights were adequate. 82 The district court found that the belt buckles
were not copyrightable because they did not meet the requirements of
separability and independent existence of artistic features. 83
The Court of Appeals reversed.84 It first noted the lack of assistance
provided by the relevant authorities in determining copyrightability for works
of applied art. 85 The court then adopted the suggestion of the House Report,
77 Id.
78 Id. The court described the "Vaquero" model as consisting of "two curved
grooves running diagonally across one comer of a modified rectangle and a third groove
running across the opposite comer." Id. The court described the "Winchester" model as
follows: "two parallel grooves cut[ting] horizontally across the center of a more tapered
form, making a curving ridge which [was] completed by the tongue of the buckle. A
smaller single curved groove flow[ed] diagonally across the comer above the tongue." Id
Photographs of both models appear in the opinion, id. at 995, and are also available at
CoolCopyright, http://www.coolcopyright.com/cases/chp4/kieselsteinpearl.htm (last
visited Jan. 27, 2008).
79 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 991. The Winchester experienced such great
commercial success that it accounted for ninety-five percent of the plaintiffs jewelry
sales in 1979. Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. Copying was not in dispute, as some of the defendant's order blanks even
referred to its buckles as "Barry K Copy," "BK copy," and "Barry Kieselstein Knock-
off." Id.
82 Id. The second issue, whether the copyrights were adequate, would require
analysis of copyright notice standards under both the 1909 and 1976 Acts, which is
beyond the scope of this Note. In any case, this issue was not relevant on appeal. Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 994.
85 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 992-93 ("[N]one of the authorities-the Mazer
opinion, the old regulations, or the statute-offer any 'ready answer to the line-drawing
problem inherent in delineating the extent of copyright protection available for works of
applied art."' (quoting NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[B][3])).
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accepting the idea that separability can occur either physically or
conceptually.86 The Court found conceptually separable elements in the belt
buckles, as had consumers who had worn the buckles as ornamentation on
different parts of the body. 87 However, the Court of Appeals did not
formulate a clear test for conceptual separability; it merely stated that "[t]he
primary ornamental aspect of the Vaquero and Winchester buckles is
conceptually separable from their subsidiary utilitarian function. '88 The court
then classified the buckles as jewelry, and noted that the form of jewelry is
copyrightable. 89
Judge Weinstein dissented, noting that the buckles were aesthetically
pleasing, but concluding that "their innovations of form are inseparable from
the important function they serve-helping to keep the tops of trousers at
waist level." 90 Judge Weinstein further argued that the plaintiff's ability to
completely integrate the artistic and functional aspects of the buckles
precluded copyright protection.91 While not explicitly rejecting conceptual
separability as a basis for copyright protection, Judge Weinstein essentially
advocated a physical separability test.92
In Kieselstein-Cord, the Second Circuit laid the foundation for protecting
the PGS elements of a useful article on the basis of conceptual separability
alone.93 However, in doing so, it did not formulate a readily discernable test
for conceptual separability. 94 The court's analysis has been characterized as a
"primary/subsidiary test for conceptual separability." 95 Even so, the court's
86 Id. at 993. The court explicitly rejected the defendant's argument that copyright
protection could not be based in conceptual separability alone. Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). Notably, the majority opinion mentioned
that consumers often wore the buckles on other parts of the body. Id. at 991 (majority
opinion). Perhaps this fact itself disproves Judge Weinstein's assertion that the aesthetic
design of the buckles was inseparable from their utilitarian function. See Perlmutter,
supra note 74, at 360 (noting that consumers saw the works as more than just belt
buckles).
91 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
92 Perlmutter, supra note 74, at 360 (observing that, while Judge Weinstein quoted
the House Report language, see supra note 73, he also cited Esquire with approval).
93 See Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
94 See Perimutter, supra note 74, at 359 (pointing out a number of issues the court
left unanswered in applying its primary/secondary dichotomy).
95 See Fowles, supra note 64, at 311. The primary/subsidiary label is an appropriate
description of the court's conclusion, as the court found the buckles copyrightable by
separating the primary aesthetic or ornamental function of the buckles from their
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opinion does not provide enough detail as to how this separation should be
determined. A test which lacks such detail would still leave open the door for
judges to give effect to their own personal biases regarding the nature of
art.96 Not long after the Kieselstein-Cord decision, however, the Second
Circuit revisited conceptual separability.
In Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., the Second Circuit
considered the copyrightability of mannequins of partial human torsos used
to display articles of clothing. 97 The plaintiff designed four life-sized human
torso forms, without arms, legs, or backs, made out of expandable white
styrene, meant to display clothing.98 The plaintiffs president stated that the
forms' commercial success made him believe they were being purchased for
their artistically sculptured features, not merely their function.99
The defendant, Economy, copied the plaintiff's forms and sold them at a
lower price.100 When Carol Barnhart sued for infringement, the district court
granted Economy's motion for summary judgment because the forms did not
meet the separability requirement.' 0
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that "the aesthetic and artistic
features of the Barnhart forms [were] inseparable from the forms' use as
utilitarian articles."' 1 2 In doing so, the court explained that the aesthetic
subsidiary utilitarian function as part of a trouser height-maintenance system. See
Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
96 Commentators have said that the primary/secondary distinction was not even
necessary to the court's conclusion, and that it was not meant to serve as a test for future
cases. Instead, the court based its decision on a "we know it when we see it" rationale.
Perlmutter, supra note 74, at 359.
97 Carol Bamhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411,412 (2d Cir. 1985).
98 Id. Two of the forms represented male torsos and two represented female torsos.
Two of the torsos, one male and one female, were unclad and meant to display shirts and
sweaters; the other two were sculpted with shirts to display sweaters and jackets. Id. The
forms were anatomically accurate and life-like except for the fact that they had hollow
backs to hold excess fabric when a piece of clothing was placed onto the form. Id.
Photographs of the two male forms are available at Cool Copyright,
http://www.coolcopyright.com/cases/chp4/bamharteconomy.htm (last visited Jan. 27,
2008). Photographs of all four of the forms appear in CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT
LAW 188 (6th ed. 2003, reprint 2005).
99 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 413. Note that the great commercial success was due
to purchases by Barnhart's primary customers, visual merchandisers, and not, for
example, purchases by home consumers for display in living rooms. See id.
100 Id. Copying was not in dispute, as Economy conceded copying and substantial
similarity for the purposes of its summary judgment motion. Id.
101 Id. at 414 (explaining the district court's holding that the forms were not
copyrightable because they "possessed no aesthetic features that could exist, either
physically or conceptually, separate from the forms as utilitarian articles").
102 Id. at 418.
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satisfaction and value of the forms, as indicated by the fact that they were
used for purposes other than modeling clothes, was not enough to show that
the forms had features that were physically or conceptually separable from
their utilitarian function-displaying clothes. 103
The court went on to distinguish the mannequins from the belt buckles at
issue in Kieselstein-Cord. It noted that the conceptually separable ornamental
aspects of the belt buckles "were not in any respect. required by their
utilitarian functions; the artistic and aesthetic features could thus be
conceived of as having been added to, or superimposed upon, an otherwise
utilitarian article."' 104 The aesthetic or artistic features of the mannequins,
such as the anatomically correct configurations of the shoulders or breasts,
were "inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the display of
clothes."1 05
The majority opinion in Carol Barnhart can be read as adopting the
following test for conceptual separability: If the artistic and aesthetic features
of a useful article are mandated by the utilitarian functions of the article,
those features are not conceptually separable and thus are not copyrightable;
if, on the other hand, the features are not mandated by the article's utilitarian
functions, they can be conceived of as having been added to the useful article
and are thus conceptually separable and copyrightable. 0 6
Judge Newman, in his dissent, summarized four possible tests for
conceptual separability and then offered his own. 10 7 The first test concerns
usage; it would deny copyrightability to an article that primarily serves its
utilitarian function. 10 8 Newman warned that the problem with this approach
103 Id. The other uses of the forms included their use "as decorating props and signs
without any clothing or accessories." Id. Presumably, these uses were by the same
purchasers who also used the forms for their clothing display function.
The court also rejected Barnhart's contention that the forms should be subject to a
lower level of scrutiny because they fit the "traditional category of sculpture of the
human body." Id. The court noted that this argument was not supported by the statute or
legislative history, and that accepting it would run counter to the policy of avoiding
discrimination based on subjective concepts of art. See id.
104 Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
105 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419 (emphasis added).
106 See Nathan C. Rogers, Copyright Protection: A Dead Fish for Sculptors of
Taxidermy Mannequins?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 159, 167 (1998) (noting that the court
distinguished Barnhart's mannequins from the belt buckles in Kieselstein-Cord because
the design of the mannequins was "entirely dictated by utility" and because the utilitarian
and aesthetic elements were "inextricably intertwined") (internal citations omitted).
107 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419-22 (Newman, J., dissenting).
108 1d. at 421 ("An article used primarily to serve its utilitarian function might be
regarded as lacking 'conceptually separable' design elements even though those design
elements rendered it usable secondarily solely as an artistic work.").
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is that it would deny protection to designs of art displayed by a minority
because a majority uses them as useful articles; the copyrightability of a
work of art should not be denied just because a majority of people use it as
something else.10 9
The next standard, which Newman derived from Kieselstein-Cord, would
grant protection "whenever the decorative or aesthetically pleasing aspect of
the article can be said to be 'primary' and the utilitarian function can be said
to be 'subsidiary.""'I1 0 This approach, according to Judge Newman, gives the
finder of fact very little guidance as to what is being measured by the
classifications "primary" and "subsidiary."'
Judge Newman next explained Professor Nimmer's approach:
"conceptual separability exists where there is any substantial likelihood that
even if the article had no utilitarian use it would still be marketable to some
significant segment of the community simply because of its aesthetic
qualities.' ' 112 Judge Newman identified the problem with this approach as
potentially granting protection only to popular art.113
The fourth test would find conceptual separability "whenever the design
of a form has sufficient aesthetic appeal to be appreciated for its artistic
qualities."1 4 This test fails because it was rejected by Congress in the House
Report, which stated that if the artistic features cannot be identified
separately, there is no protection even if the features are 'aesthetically
satisfying and valuable."' 115
109 See id As an example, Judge Newman explained, "[t]he copyrightable design of
a life-size sculpture of the human body should not lose its copyright protection simply
because mannequin manufacturers copy it, replicate it in cheap materials, and sell it in
large quantities to department stores to display clothing." Id. Thus, it seems he was
concerned that the usage test would deny protection to creators who are motivated by
artistic considerations but whose works end up having both artistic and practical value.
110 Id.
111 Id. Commentators have expressed this same concern with the primary/subsidiary
test. See Perlmutter, supra note 74, at 359.
112 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 421 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting NIMMER,
supra note 6, at § 2.08).
113 Id. at 422. Judge Newman further suggests that the class of people who would
recognize the purely aesthetic qualities of such an article would be larger than the class of
people who would actually purchase it for those aesthetic qualities; thus, while a large
number of people might consider an object art, it might still fail to be marketable to a
"significant segment of the community." See id.
14 Id.
115 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976)). To illustrate, Judge Newman
uses the example of an artistically designed chair worthy of display in a museum. The
fact that it has artistic value alone does not satisfy conceptual separability, he argues,
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Finally, Judge Newman offered his own test for conceptual separability.
He concluded that in order for the design to be conceptually separate, "the
article must stimulate in the mind of the beholder a concept that is separate
from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function.""16 He explained, "[t]he
test turns on what may reasonably be understood to be occurring in the mind
of the beholder, or, as some might say, in the 'mind's eye' of the
beholder." 1 7
Judge Newman explained that the "beholder" in his test is "the ordinary,
reasonable observer" used in other areas of copyright law. 18 Thus, the finder
of fact "determines the issue in light of the impressions reasonably expected
to be made upon the hypothetical ordinary observer."" 19
Judge Newman further elaborated that the necessary separateness is
present "whenever the design creates in the mind of the ordinary observer
two different concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously."'120
He used the example of an artistically designed chair; the utilitarian function
of the chair cannot be displaced in the mind of the ordinary observer by some
other concept, no matter how artistically designed the chair is. 121
Judge Newman insisted that it is not sufficient for the design of an article
to create in the ordinary observer's mind any concept distinct from the
utilitarian function; a non-utilitarian concept is separate from the concept of
the utilitarian function only if the ordinary observer can entertain the non-
utilitarian concept without simultaneously contemplating the utilitarian
function. 122 Finally, Judge Newman noted that under his test, judges will
have to partake in some assessment as to the nature of art, but that such a
because the observer still sees a "well-designed chair," not a piece of art whose design is
conceptually separate from its utilitarian function. See id
16 Id.
118 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting). For example,
Newman explains that courts use a hypothetical ordinary observer when determining
copyright infringement. Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. Judge Newman goes on to note that this displacement may occur, however,
when viewing other useful objects if the ordinary observer does not at all perceive the
utilitarian function. Id. Even the chair example may not be as concrete as Judge Newman
makes it out to be. One could imagine an artistically designed chair that has a large spike
protruding from the top of the seat, or one that has no seat at all. Because these two
examples would completely fail to carry out the utilitarian function of a chair-providing
a place to sit-perhaps the ordinary observer would not at all perceive the utilitarian
function, causing Judge Newman's test to be satisfied. Such a possibility indicates that
even Judge Newman's test is limited by judges' individual biases and concepts of art.
122 Id. at 423.
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threshold assessment is inevitable because the non-utilitarian concept offered
to satisfy conceptual separability will often be the concept of the article as a
work of art.123 However, Judge Newman allowed for consideration of other
evidence in making conceptual separability determinations, such as the fact
that an object has been used in a non-utilitarian manner, the extent of such
use, and whether such use resulted from purchases, as well as expert opinion
and survey evidence. 124 While Judge Newman's opinion was not for the
court, it is valuable as a discussion of possible conceptual separability tests.
His preferred test was also advocated by a dissenting judge in the Second
Circuit's next conceptual separability case. 125
Two years later, the Second Circuit again considered conceptual
separability in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co. 126
In Brandir, the Court of Appeals considered the copyrightability of a bicycle
rack known as the "RIBBON Rack. ' 127 The rack was made of bent tubing
and was said to have originated from a wire sculpture. 128 Brandir's owner
explained that he had created the wire sculpture as a means of personal
expression and had not considered its utilitarian application until he
accidentally juxtaposed another wire sculpture, one of a bicycle, on the first
sculpture. 129 Brandir marketed and sold the rack and, in November 1982,
discovered that Cascade was selling a similar product. 130 Brandir sued
Cascade for copyright infringement, and the district court granted Cascade's
motion for summary judgment.131
123 Id.
124 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 423 (Newman, J., dissenting).
125 See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
126 Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
127 Id. at 1143.
128 Id. The shape of the upright rack when viewed at a perpendicular angle, as
indicated by a picture attached to the opinion, could be said to resemble a serpent seen
from a bird's-eye view. Id. at 1150. A photograph is also available at CoolCopyright,
http://www.coolcopyright.com/cases/chp4/brandircascade.htm (last visited Jan. 27,
2008).
129 Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1146. Part of what made the RIBBON Rack commercially
successful was the fact that bicycles could be parked both on top of the underloops and
under the overloops. See id. Upon discovering the potential usefulness of the sculpture
design as a bicycle rack, the creator met with other developers and submitted plans,
including dimensions, to a fabricator. See id. Thus, the large form of the sculpture was
not contemplated or created until after the creator considered its use as a bicycle rack.
130 Id.
131 See id. at 1143. Brandir also sued for trademark infringement and unfair
competition, legal theories that are beyond the scope of this Note.
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The Court of Appeals affirmed. 132 It ratified the notion of conceptual
separability as a basis for copyright protection, but noted that it was unclear
as to how it should apply the doctrine. 133 The court explicitly rejected Judge
Newman's test from Carol Barnhart.134 Instead, the court adopted an
analysis proposed by Professor Denicola that "'[c]opyrightability ... should
turn on the relationship between the proffered work and the process of
industrial design." ' 135 The court explained, "where design elements can be
identified as reflecting the designer's artistic judgment exercised
independently of functional influences, conceptual separability exists."']36
Thus, the Second Circuit adopted a conceptual separability test that
seems to turn on the subjective design process of the creator.137 It gave three
reasons for adopting this test. First, the court believed the approach was
consistent with its previous cases. 138 Second, the court believed the test's
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1144 ("'Conceptual separability' is thus alive and well, at least in this
circuit. The problem, however, is determining exactly what it is and how it is to be
applied.").
134 Id. at 1147 ("[I]t is not enough that, to paraphrase Judge Newman, the rack may
stimulate in the mind of the reasonable observer a concept separate from the bicycle rack
concept.").
135 Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and
Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L.
REv. 707, 741 (1983)).
136 Id. In full, the court articulated the test as follows:
To state the Denicola test in the language of conceptual separability, if design
elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic
aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian
elements. Conversely, where design elements can be identified as reflecting the
designer's artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences,
conceptual separability exists.
Id.
137 However, the court stated:
The work itself will continue to give "mute testimony" of its origins. In
addition, the parties will be required to present evidence relating to the design
process and the nature of the work, with the trier of fact making the determination
whether the aesthetic design elements are significantly influenced by functional
considerations.
Id. at 1145-46. Thus, while the test turns on the subjective considerations of the
designer during the design process, it allows finders of fact to consider objective evidence
of those subjective considerations; a designer's statement that his process was influenced
only by artistic, not utilitarian, concerns, is not conclusive.
138 Id. at 1145. The court explained that the previous conceptual separability cases
would have come out the same way. In Kieselstein-Cord, the artistic aspects of the belt
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emphasis on utilitarian influence in the design process would help courts
avoid having to make subjective determinations of what constitutes art. 139
Finally, the court believed that, as a practical matter, the Denicola test would
not be too difficult to administer. 140 Applying its newly adopted test, the
Court of Appeals held that the RIBBON Rack was not copyrightable because
its design was influenced by utilitarian concerns.141
Judge Winter dissented from the court's judgment on the copyright
claim. 142 He argued that the majority's approach "diminishe[d] the statutory
concept of 'conceptual separability' to the vanishing point."'143 He also stated
that the majority's focus on the design process made copyrightability turn on
"largely fortuitous circumstances" surrounding the creation of the work. 144
Rather than attempt to reconcile Carol Barnhart with Kieselstein-Cord,
Judge Winter said they are irreconcilable and concluded that the Carol
Barnhart court used a physical, not a conceptual, separability test.145 Finally,
Judge Winter indicated that he prefers Judge Newman's ordinary observer
buckles were the result of purely aesthetic choices, while the artistic elements of the
torsos in Carol Barnhart were influenced by the torsos' utilitarian functions. Id.
139 See id. ("[T]he test's emphasis on the influence of utilitarian concerns in the
design process may help... to alleviate the de facto discrimination against
nonrepresentational art that has regrettably accompanied much of the current analysis.")
(citations omitted).
140 Id.
141 Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147-48. The court noted that, while the rack may have
been derived from earlier artistic sculptures, its final form was heavily motivated by
utilitarian considerations. See id.
142 Judge Winter actually concurred in part and dissented in part. He concurred in
the majority's reversal of the district court's grant of summary judgment on the
trademark and unfair competition claims, but dissented from the majority's judgment on
the copyright claim. Id. at 1150 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Thus, for present purposes, the important part of Judge Winter's opinion is his dissent.
143 Id. at 1151.
144 Id. Later, Judge Winter disagreed that protection turns on whether the designer
"serendipitously chose the final design of the Ribbon Rack during his initial sculptural
musings or whether the original design had to be slightly modified to accommodate
bicycles." Id. at 1152.
145 Id. 1151. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Winter focused on language in the
Carol Barnhart opinion distinguishing the aesthetic features of the belt buckles in
Kieselstein-Cord. That language noted that, unlike the aesthetic features of the torsos,
those of the buckles were "added to, or superimposed upon, an otherwise utilitarian
article." Id. at 1151 (quoting Carol Bamhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411,
419 (2d Cir. 1985)) (emphasis supplied by Judge Winter, but not in original).
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test for conceptual separability. 146
The conceptual separability jurisprudence of the Second Circuit can be
summarized as follows: The test for conceptual separability asks whether the
design elements are influenced by aesthetic considerations, independent from
utilitarian concerns.1 47 Dissenters believe that conceptual separability should
turn on whether the article can stimulate in the mind of an ordinary observer
a concept that is unrelated to the utilitarian functions of the article. 148 The
dispute over the appropriate standard for conceptual separability is no longer
limited to the Second Circuit. As indicated by Subparts F and G below, the
substance of the modern conceptual separability debate is not merely the
views of a few dissenting judges. It is instead a clash in the prevailing
jurisprudence of different circuits.
F. Pivot Point: The Seventh Circuit Follows Suit
While conceptual separability was primarily developed in the Second
Circuit, it later found its place in other circuits. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit recently considered the issue of conceptual separability in
Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc. 149 In Pivot Point,
Passage, the plaintiffs founder, sought to develop a mannequin that would
depict a runway model's "hungry look."' 50 He believed that such a
mannequin could be marketed to high-end hairstylists. 15 1 Passage hired
Heerlein, a German artist, to create a sculpture of a female head.' 52 Passage
discussed his "vision" with Heerlein but did not give specific dimensional
requirements.153 Heerlein then created a plaster sculpture entitled "Mara" and
assigned his rights in the sculpture to Pivot Point.154 Pivot Point successfully
146 Id. at 1151 ("[T]he relevant question is whether the design of a useful article,
however intertwined with the article's utilitarian aspects, causes an ordinary reasonable
observer to perceive an aesthetic concept not related to the article's use.").
147 See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (majority opinion).
148 See id. at 1151 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Carol
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
149 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004).
150 Id. at 915. Photographs of Pivot Point mannequins are available at Pivot Point
Store, http://www.pivotpointshop.com/ProductCartlpc/viewCatP.asp?idCategory=100
(last visited Jan. 27, 2008). Although the website does not appear to market the original
Mara mannequin at issue in the case, one can see by viewing some of the mannequins
that the designs have distinguishing features.
151 Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 915.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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marketed and sold the Mara mannequin, and eventually sold different
versions, altering the types and lengths of hair, skin tones, and makeup, but
leaving intact the original facial features. 155
The defendant marketed a "Liza" mannequin, "which was very close in
appearance to Pivot Point's Mara" and had "strikingly similar facial
features."' 156 The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the Mara mannequin was not copyrightable because it
did not satisfy conceptual separability. 157 In doing so, the district court
adopted Professor Goldstein's conceptual separability test, which asks
whether the aesthetic features can stand alone as art and whether the article
would still serve its utilitarian function without the aesthetic features.158
The court of appeals reversed. 159 It rejected the Goldstein test as
protecting too narrow a class of works. 160 After discussing the Second
Circuit conceptual separability cases, 161 the court adopted the prevailing
Second Circuit test and held that conceptual separability exists when 'the
design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer's artistic
judgment exercised independently of functional influences."" 162 The court
then found that the Mara sculpture was copyrightable because it was the
product of Heerlein's artistic judgment, thus allowing the sculpture to be
155 Id. at 915-16.
156 Id. at 916. Charlene Products' mannequins can be seen at
http://www.charleneproducts.com/ (follow "products" link, then select "lady
mannequins") (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). While the company offers a Liza mannequin, it
is not clear how closely the Liza mannequin resembles the allegedly infringing
mannequin in Pivot Point.
157 See Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 917.
158 See id. (explaining the district court's holding that a PGS feature in a useful
article "is conceptually separable if it can stand on its own as [sic] work of art
traditionally conceived, and if the useful article in which it is embodied would be equally
useful without it") (quoting GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 109).
159 Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 932.
160 See id at 924 ("[W]e believe that the test, at least when applied alone, is tied too
closely to physical separability and, consequently, does not give a sufficiently wide berth
to Congress' determination that artistic material conceptually separate from the utilitarian
design can satisfy the statutory mandate.").
The court also rejected a test offered by Pivot Point that would have required a
finding of conceptual separability in "a 'work of art' integrated into a useful article, or a
'work of art' put to unexpected use, since the independent concepts of art and utility
coexist." Id. at 923 (internal citation omitted). The court rejected this test, however,
because it involved "judges in a qualitative evaluation of artistic endeavors-a function
for which judicial office is hardly a qualifier." Id.
161 Id. at 924-28. The court discussed the same cases addressed in Part III.E., supra.
16 2 Id. at 931 (quoting Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d
1142, 1145(2d Cir. 1987)).
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conceptualized as existing independently of its use in hair display or makeup
training. 163
Judge Kanne dissented, stating that the Goldstein test was a reasonable
explanation of the statutory language and that the Mara sculpture failed this
test. 164 He pointed out that the statute looks to the useful article as it exists
and not to the creative process.' 65 Finally, Judge Kanne concluded that even
if the majority's test were acceptable, Mara would fail the test because, from
the beginning, Pivot Point intended that the sculpture serve a functional
purpose and commissioned the sculpture's creation to fulfill that purpose.' 66
163 Id. at 931. The court noted that there was "no evidence that Heerlein's artistic
judgment was constrained by functional considerations;" Passage gave him no
dimensional requirements and did not mention functional considerations. Id. at 931-32. It
is unclear from the opinion, but perhaps the result would have been different if Passage
had indicated to Heerlein his intention to market the mannequin as a hair display or
makeup training tool. Such a result would, of course, validate Judge Winter's concern
that the Second Circuit's process-influence test would cause protection to turn on largely
fortuitous circumstances. See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1151 (Winter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
164 Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 933 (Kanne, J., dissenting) ("[The aesthetic] features are
incapable of being identified separately from the utilitarian use of those features. Without
features, the mannequin's head and neck would be little more than an egg on a stick,
useless for its intended purpose.").
165 Id. at 934.
166 Id. This point introduces an additional issue into the conceptual separability
discussion: copyright ownership. Judge Kanne noted that Pivot Point intended the
sculpture to serve a functional purpose; however, it was Heerlein who designed the
mannequin with hardly any input from Pivot Point. Id. at 915. The default owner of a
copyright in a work is the author or creator of that work (in this case, Heerlein). 17
U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). This is why Heerlein had to assign his copyright interest to Pivot
Point. If we accept as true the proposition that Heerlein's design was driven only by
artistic, not functional, influence (as the Pivot Point majority did), then the Pivot
Point/Second Circuit conceptual separability test would be satisfied with regards to
Heerlein.
Pivot Point, on the other hand, originally commissioned the work with functional
considerations in mind. Thus, if Pivot Point had designed Mara itself, the Pivot
Point/Second Circuit conceptual separability test would not be satisfied. However,
instead of creating the mannequin itself, Pivot Point outsourced the work to a designer
and did not inform him of any functional concerns it had. When Heerlein created Mara,
copyright vested in him (since his design process satisfied conceptual separability). He
was then able to transfer the copyright to Pivot Point, an entity which probably would not
have met the conceptual separability requirement, and therefore could not have enjoyed
copyright protection had it designed the exact same mannequin itself.
This dichotomy could allow persons or companies to circumvent the limits of
conceptual separability by hiring product designers and giving them vague artistic
direction while concealing the intended functional applications of the commissioned
works. In such situations, courts might attempt to assess conceptual separability from the
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G. Galiano: The Fifth Circuit Counters
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered conceptual
separability and rejected the Pivot Point standard only one year after the
Seventh Circuit's decision. 167 In Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc.,
Galiano had entered into an agreement with Harrah's which provided that
Galiano would design uniforms for Harrah's casino employees, and the
companies' exchanges led to several proposed sketches.' 68 Galiano, which
could not produce patterns of the sketch designs or make the finished
uniforms, entered into a manufacturing agreement with one of Harrah's
suppliers. 169 After the contract between Galiano and Harrah's expired and
the companies failed to extend it, Harrah's continued to order the Galiano-
designed uniforms from its suppliers. 170 Over three years later, Galiano
registered the sketches with the Copyright Office.171
Galiano sued Harrah's for copyright infringement. 172 The district court
ruled in favor of Harrah's and held that Galiano's copyright was valid only to
the extent that it protected the two-dimensional artwork and that the artistic
and utilitarian elements of the uniforms were not conceptually separable. 173
perspective of the entity that commissions the product and not the author. However, there
is no statutory basis for such an assessment, as the Copyright Act vests copyright in the
author of a work, not the person or entity who commissions it (and the work made for
hire doctrine, 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(b) & 101 (2000), would not apply in this situation).
Because copyright vests upon fixation, not transfer, it makes sense to assess separability
with regard to the original author, not the author's assignee.
167 Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005).
168 Id. at 413.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. The certificate of registration classified the sketches as "2-dimensional
artwork." Id. (internal citation omitted). The registered collection consisted of "more than
fifty colored and numbered illustrations, including sketches of uniform style shirts,
blouses, vests, jackets, pants, shorts, ensembles, elaborate masquerade-type costumes,
and unique head gear and a dozen pages of silkscreen artwork." Id. Examples of items in
the collection included chef hats shaped like vegetables and uniform shirts with
asymmetric closures, piped mandarin collars, embroidered logos, star-shaped buttons,
and coin designs. Id. at n.3.
172 Id. at 414.
173 See Galiano, 416 F.3d at 414. The court of appeals noted that the lower court
reasoned that "copyright law does not allow one to copyright 'clothing designs' in which
the artistic and utilitarian qualities are indivisible . .. ." Id. The court further explained
the district court's holding: "Because none of these design features has intrinsic value as
a work of art that can exist independently of the uniform wearing apparel, the district
court concluded, they do not qualify for copyright protection." Id. at 415.
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 174 It found that Galiano's designs lacked
conceptual separability but declined to adopt the Pivot Point test. 175 The
court did not reject the Pivot Point test outright but refused to apply it
because it was not clear how much influence Pivot Point would carry in the
federal courts. 176 Instead, the court adopted Professor Nimmer's test, which
it believed was more appropriate for garment design cases. 177 This test asks
whether the useful article would be marketable if it had no utilitarian
function.178 The court went on to state that the Pivot Point and Nimmer tests
might not necessarily be incompatible and, therefore, adopted Nimmer's
marketability test only for clothing design. 179 It concluded that Galiano made
no showing that the designs were marketable independently of their function
as casino uniforms.' 80
IV. WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TESTS
This Part articulates the currently available conceptual separability tests
and discusses the weaknesses of each. Subpart A discusses the marketability
test proposed by Professor Nimmer and adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Galiano. Subpart B addresses the design process test proposed by Professor
Denicola and applied by the Second and Seventh Circuits in Brandir and
Pivot Point, respectively. Subpart C addresses the objective test adopted by
the Seventh Circuit in Carol Barnhart. Subpart D considers Professor
Goldstein's test, which Judge Kanne advocated in his dissent in Pivot Point.
Finally, Subpart E discusses the somewhat ethereal test Judge Newman
articulated in his dissent in Carol Barnhart. As indicated below, some
primary flaws run through several of the tests. Some of the tests require
judges to make conceptual separability determinations based on popular
notions of art or on their own biased conceptions of art. Some of the tests do
17 4 Id. at 423.
175 Id. at 418.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 421.
178 Id. ("[Ult may be concluded that conceptual separability exists where there is
substantial likelihood that even if the article had no utilitarian use it would still be
marketable to some significant segment of the community simply because of its aesthetic
qualities.") (quoting NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.08[B] [3]).
179 Galiano, 416 F.3d at 421. However, the court also seemed to acknowledge that
the Nimmer test has weaknesses, though it believed that it was the best one available for
the fact pattern and that any weaknesses failed to offset the benefits of the test. See id.
(noting that sometimes, a court must "favor what might be a sub-optimal prophylactic
rule").
180 Id. at 422.
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not acknowledge the realities of the industrial design process and the
inevitable impact of functional concerns. These problems can cause
unpredictability and can reduce or eliminate designers' incentives to develop
artistically inspired useful articles.
A. The Nimmer/Galiano Marketability Test
Professor Nimmer suggests that "conceptual separability exists where
there is any substantial likelihood that even if the article had no utilitarian use
it would still be marketable to some significant segment of the community
simply because of its aesthetic qualities."' 181 This is the standard adopted by
the Fifth Circuit in Galiano.182 The major problem with this test is that it will
always favor protection for works that more closely resemble mainstream art.
While the test may reduce the amount by which judges' personal opinions of
the nature of art influence outcomes, the test significantly increases the
influence of the personal opinions of other people.' 83 Furthermore, the test's
community standard could lead to different outcomes in different courts for
the same article. This lack of consistency is certainly not a desirable side
effect, especially considering that it is inconsistency among the courts that
has led to the confusion surrounding conceptual separability in the first place.
Finally, this test would allow protection to turn on fortuitous circumstances
beyond the designer's control. If copyright protection is unpredictable,
designers will be less likely to develop new designs for useful articles for
fear that the designs will be copied.
B. The Brandir/Pivot Point Design Process Test
Professor Denicola argued that the separability inquiry should focus on
the design process. He explained that "copyrightability ultimately should
181 NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.08[B][3].
182 See Galiano, 416 F.3d at 419.
183 The test could also harm designers whose works are targeted to a narrow class of
consumers if a larger class of consumers would not purchase the work for its aesthetic
qualities. To illustrate his marketability test, Professor Nimmer uses the example of an
automobile incapable of locomotion; it is not likely, he says, that anyone would purchase
it "simply to display its attractive shape." NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.08[B][3].
While it might be true that the vast majority of consumers would not make such a
purchase, one can imagine an automobile enthusiast who would purchase an
imaginatively designed, non-drivable automobile simply for its aesthetic qualities. If the
designer creates the non-moving automobile with such an enthusiast in mind, the
designer should not be denied copyright protection merely because he chose to design his
work for a narrow class of collectors who do not make up a "significant segment of the
community." Such a result would discourage the development of nontraditional art forms.
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depend on the extent to which the work reflects artistic expression
uninhibited by functional considerations."' 184 The Second Circuit gave effect
to this test in Brandir when it stated, "if design elements reflect a merger of
aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot
be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements."' 185 This is
the same test adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Pivot Point.
As Professor Denicola notes, a process-based approach would force
judges to look beyond appearance alone.' 86 In turn, this would help prevent
judges' personal biases from influencing their decisions. Furthermore, this
test would, to an extent, allow the designer's intent to affect the
copyrightability of his or her work. However, standing alone, this test is
problematic because it ignores the fact that the design process of a useful
article will inherently be influenced by functional considerations. Even the
most artistic designers of useful articles will want consumers to purchase
those articles; thus, they will inevitably be influenced by functional
considerations, at least to some degree. The Pivot Point test would prevent
such designers from obtaining copyright protection. Furthermore, as Judge
Winter noted in his dissent in Brandir, a process-based test could promote
inconsistency by allowing copyrightability to turn on fortuitous
circumstances.' 87 Such inconsistency is intolerable.
184 Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach
to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MiNN. L. REv. 707, 741 (1983). Professor Denicola
argues that "[o]nly such a direct assessment of the nature of the claimant's contribution
can implement the congressional decision to exclude the general realm of industrial
design, while preserving exclusive rights in 'applied art."' Id.
185 Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir.
1987).
186 Denicola, supra note 184, at 743. Professor Denicola further argues that tests that
focus on appearance cannot distinguish industrial design from applied art, and that "[i]t is
the process more than the result that gives industrial design its distinctive character." Id.
(emphasis omitted).
187 See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1150 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Winter further notes that copyright protection is meant to establish incentives
for designers to create their works, and thus, should not depend on "purely fortuitous
events." Id. at 1152.
Under the process distinction, two designers who independently create the exact
same work could be treated differently if one considers functional requirements and the
other does not. The Denicola test allows copyright protection for the designer who does
not consider function, despite the fact that the two works are the same. This result seems
absurd because it encourages designers not to consider whether their works will be
commercially successful or to refuse to act on such considerations if they do come to
mind.
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C. The Carol Barnhart Objective Test
The Second Circuit applied an objective test in Carol Barnhart.
According to that court, the aesthetic features embodied in a useful article are
conceptually separable from that article if they are not required by the
article's utilitarian features. 188 Professor Patry offers a very similar
formulation of an objective test. He argues that conceptual separability is met
when a useful article embodies original pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
elements and when the form or function of the work does not require those
elements. 189 He says, however, that the aesthetic features need not be
completely uninfluenced by functional considerations.190
This test has some advantages. First, the Carol Barnhart test is different
enough from physical separability so as to actually allow protection when
physical separability is lacking. This is not the case for all of the tests.
Second, the objective test greatly reduces the chance that a judge's personal
biases regarding the nature of art will control the outcome of litigation.
Determining whether an element is dictated by the form or function of a
useful article merely requires an inquiry into whether there was an alternative
design choice available. Still, the test is not without its flaws. The test's
biggest problem is that it does not clarify when a feature of a useful article is
dictated by function. The court's articulation of the test suggests that this is a
"yes or no" issue; that is, if a design element is required by function at all, no
matter how little the degree, the design is not conceptually separable (though
the Patry formulation avoids this problem by allowing some functional
influence). Furthermore, by directing judges to consider the original PGS
elements embodied in a useful article, the test invites judges to isolate and
analyze individual aspects of the work. However, it is the overall design of
the work, not any individual element, for which the designer seeks copyright
188 See Carol Bamhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411,419 (2d Cir. 1985).
189 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 285 (1994). Professor
Patry says of conceptual separability:
It should be satisfied when (1) original pictorial, graphic, or sculptural elements
can be identified as being embodied in a three-dimensional useful article; and (2)
those elements are not dictated by either the form or the functions of the useful
article. Contrary to the Copyright Office definition, it should not be necessary that
the conceptually separable elements be independent of the useful article.
Id.
For an interesting discussion of a similar approach, one that would adopt trademark
law's "alternative design" standard, see Setliff, supra note 63, at 71-75.
190PATRY, supra note 189, at 285. Professor Patry explains, "[c]ontrary to the
Brandir majority, it also should not be necessary that the conceptually separable elements
be uninfluenced by the form or functions of the useful article." Id. Thus, his test allows
designers to entertain practical concerns that will allow them to better sell their works.
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protection. 191
D. The Goldstein Test
Professor Goldstein articulates conceptual separability as follows: "a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature incorporated in the design of a useful
article is conceptually separable if it can stand on its own as a work of art
traditionally conceived, and if the useful article in which it is embodied
would be equally useful without it."1192 The district court applied this test-
and the Seventh Circuit rejected it-in Pivot Point.193 Judge Kanne also
promoted this test in his dissent from the Seventh Circuit's opinion. 194 The
Goldstein test has two problems. The first part of the test (asking whether the
PGS feature can stand on its own as a traditional work of art) invites finders
of fact to use their own personal biases and opinions of the nature of art in
determining whether a useful article is copyrightable. The test would
therefore hurt designers who wish to explore modem or abstract art with their
useful articles. The second part of the test, as noted by the majority in Pivot
Point, is very similar to physical separability. 195 Thus, the test would fail to
provide an alternative means of protection for design elements that do not
meet the rigorous physical separability standard.
E. The Newman Test
In his dissent in Carol Barnhart, Judge Newman explained that to be
conceptually separable, PGS elements "must stimulate in the mind of the
beholder a concept that is separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian
function."'1 96 The "beholder" in Judge Newman's test is the "ordinary,
191 Thus, a better formulation would be a requirement that the useful article embody
a potential PGS work as a whole, as opposed to a requirement that the individual
elements embody a PGS work.
192 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 109. Professor Goldstein provides a few examples
that helpfully illustrate his point: he notes that an ornamental belt buckle, a statuette used
as a lamp base, and a novelty slipper shaped like a bear's paw would all be conceptually
separable. Id.
193 See Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 917 (7th Cir.
2004).
194 Id. at 933 (Kanne, J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 924 (majority opinion).
196 Carol Bamhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., dissenting). Commentators have labeled this test the "temporal
displacement" test. PATRY, supra note 189, at 278; see also Christine Haight Farley,
Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REv. 805, 847 (2005).
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reasonable observer." 197 This test again allows copyrightability to turn on a
judge's personal biases. The judge's personal opinions of what constitutes art
will inevitably influence the judge's belief of whether a reasonable observer
would see the work as embodying something other than its utilitarian
functions. Furthermore, while the hypothetical "reasonably ordinary
observer" standard may be effective in other areas of law, it does not work in
this context. If the standard does work, it does so when applied in cases
where the issue is relatively objective. That is not the case here. Judge
Newman's test is not asking, for example, whether a reasonable observer
would see one work as substantially similar to another work. Judge
Newman's question for the reasonable observer is one that touches on the
nature of art. Ordinary reasonable people will always disagree about the
nature of art because it is a matter of personal taste and imagination. For the
same reason, ordinary reasonable people would disagree about whether a
useful article can evoke a separate concept. Thus, the issue presented by
Judge Newman's test is so abstract that the ordinary reasonable person
standard is not suitable.
Clearly, the major tests that have been proposed by the courts and
commentators have failed to simplify the conceptual separability doctrine.
An obvious effect of this failure is confusion and disagreement among the
courts. Perhaps even more alarming is the unpredictability this lack of clarity
causes when it comes to the availability of copyright protection for the
design of a particular useful article. The next Part suggests a test that would
do away with this confusion and unpredictability.
V. A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TEST
This Part proposes a resolution to the conceptual separability debate.
Subpart A proposes an alternative test for conceptual separability. The
proposed test urges courts to balance two factors: 1) the degree to which the
design process is influenced by aesthetic considerations, as opposed to
functional ones, and 2) the degree to which the design of a useful article is
dictated by its utilitarian function. Subpart B discusses the advantages of the
proposed balancing test and argues that the test serves the goals of copyright
law.
While this Note focuses on conceptual separability, courts should
continue to use physical separability as a first step in their analysis. Physical
separability is a much simpler doctrine than conceptual separability. 198
197 Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
198 See Fowles, supra note 64, at 310 (noting that physical separability is a relatively
straightforward test). By applying the physical separability test first, courts would be able
to avoid the inherent uncertainty of conceptual separability if a useful article satisfies
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Furthermore, it gives effect to Congress's intent. As evidenced by the House
Report, Congress believed that physical separability is enough for copyright
protection.99, Indeed, the relative simplicity of physical separability may
make it tempting to eliminate the doctrine of conceptual separability
altogether, especially considering the confusion conceptual separability has
caused. However, this is not an option for two reasons. First, in many
situations, physical separability will not be enough to afford the most
desirable level of protection. As discussed above, the physical separability
standard can lead to very harsh, arbitrary results.200 Second, eliminating
conceptual separability as an alternative means of obtaining protection would
directly conflict with the intent of Congress, as evidenced by the House
Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976.201 Clearly, conceptual
separability is a necessary alternative means to obtaining copyright
protection for useful articles.
A. The Proposed Alternative Test
A conceptual separability test must balance the need to protect artistic
expression with the need to make utilitarian products widely available.
Courts could accomplish this difficult task by applying a two-factor
balancing test. Courts should balance: 1) the degree to which the designer's
subjective process is motivated by aesthetic concerns, and 2) the degree to
which the design of a useful article is objectively dictated by its utilitarian
function.
The first factor requires courts to consider the degree to which aesthetic
concerns, as opposed to functional ones, motivate the designer. Unlike the
Brandir design process test, the first factor does not require that the design
process be completely uninfluenced by functional considerations in order for
conceptual separability to be satisfied. Instead of making this a clear "yes or
no" question, the proposed balancing test makes the question one of degree.
If the design is driven more by functional than aesthetic choices, then the
first factor weighs against conceptual separability. On the other hand, if
aesthetic considerations are the primary influence in the design process, then
this factor supports a finding of conceptual separability. Because the design
process of useful articles will inevitably involve attention to both aesthetic
physical separability. See NIMMER, supra note 6, at § 2.08[B][3] ("Given physical
separability, the inquiry regarding conceptual separability need not be reached ....
199 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976).
200 See Part II.C., supra.
201 H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 55 (1976). ("Unless the shape of an ... industrial product
contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable
from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted .. )
(emphasis added).
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and utilitarian concerns, courts must take note of the degree to which one
type of concern predominates over the other in the design process. That is, if
aesthetic concerns greatly dominate the design process, this factor should
weigh more heavily towards a finding of conceptual separability than if
aesthetic concerns are only mildly more influential than functional concerns.
The same approach would apply in cases where functional concerns appear
to predominate; the degree of predominance should determine how heavily
this factor weighs against conceptual separability.
In considering the first factor, courts should look to both subjective
evidence, such as the designer's testimony as to his or her process, as well as
objective evidence, such as correspondence or meetings between the designer
and other parties that might shed light on the design process. By considering
the design process as a matter of degree, courts will avoid penalizing
designers who are aware of the realities of the consumer marketplace. After
all, traditional "artists," such as painters, must consider the marketability of
their works if they wish to make a living. Designers of useful articles should
also be able to entertain such practical considerations without forfeiting
copyright protection. However, this factor of the test also allows courts to
deny protection when utilitarian concerns influence a designer too much, thus
sustaining the notion that function is not the subject of copyright.
The second factor is derived from the Carol Barnhart objective test.
However, it is somewhat modified from the Second Circuit's articulation.
Under the proposed balancing test, courts should consider the degree to
which the design of a useful article is dictated by its utilitarian function.202 If
the design is mostly dictated by function, this factor should weigh against
conceptual separability, and therefore, against copyright protection.
Conversely, if the design is hardly dictated by function at all, this factor
should weigh in favor of a finding of conceptual separability. Unlike the
Carol Barnhart test, this factor acknowledges that in some cases, the
aesthetic features of a useful article may be somewhat, but not entirely,
dictated by its form or function. For example, the utilitarian function of a
table lamp dictates that it has a flat bottom and fits on a table. However, the
function does not completely dictate the shape or width of the base. Some
elements of the base, such as its color, are not dictated by function at all.
Other elements of the lamp's design provide similar examples. Most would
agree that a lamp's utilitarian function dictate that it have a shade; however,
the size and shape of that shade are not completely dictated by function. The
rigid Carol Barnhart test could deny protection when the design of a work is
202 Cf supra note 188 and accompanying text. The Carol Barnhart formulation
suggests that separability should depend on a clear "yes or no" determination of whether
the design of a useful article is dictated by its form or function. In contrast, the proposed
two-factor balancing test makes this question one of degree.
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only somewhat dictated by function. The proposed balancing test allows the
court to treat this issue as a matter of degree rather than as an absolute.
Furthermore, this factor would not be detrimentally difficult to apply because
courts could consider objective evidence, such as the plausibility of
alternative designs (evidence of which could be provided by the designer and
other experts).
The second factor serves an important function: it limits the availability
of copyright protection. The first factor allows protection to turn on the
designer's subjective process. Focusing on the subjective process is desirable
because it prevents copyrightability from turning on the biases of judges or
consumers. However, if the test focused solely on the designer's subjective
process, it would provide too much protection. Theoretically, aesthetic
considerations could heavily dominate the design process, but the resulting
product design could be almost entirely dictated by function. Such a situation
may arise when a designer creates a useful article that is the first of its kind.
The designer may focus his or her design process almost entirely on
aesthetics and give minimal consideration to functionality. Still, the resulting
design could turn out to be the only possible form in which the product could
function. It would be inconsistent with the purposes of copyright law to grant
protection to such a design because that is exactly the type of work that
should not be subject to monopoly control. 20 3 The second prong of the
proposed balancing test would allow a court to find that the design, while
artistically motivated, is not conceptually separable.
B. Advantages of the Proposed Two-Factor Balancing Test
The two-factor balancing test has several major strengths. First, the test
focuses only on the design process (both the subjective and objective
elements). The test does not consider other elements, such as the
marketability of the work.204 The elimination of other elements is ideal
because it makes copyright protection more predictable for designers, as they
are in an easy position to judge the extent to which functional considerations
influence the overall design process and dictate certain design choices.
203 The requirement of originality, which is a prerequisite for the copyrightability of
any work, is another limit. If a design, whether artistically motivated or not, is almost
completely dictated by function, there is a good chance that it would not be original
enough to qualify for protection in the first place. The second factor of the proposed
balancing test, in addition to serving as a limit on the first factor, would also serve as a
supplement to the originality requirement. The second factor would fill in any gaps where
the design of a useful article is original but almost completely dictated by function (such
a gap could clearly exist when a product is the first of its kind).
204 See supra page 136 (discussing marketability test proposed by Professor Nimmer
and adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Galiano).
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Because the balancing test focuses on only the design process, it prevents
copyrightability from turning on fortuitous occurrences beyond the
designer's control. By making protection more predictable and less subject to
factors beyond the designer's control, the proposed test provides an incentive
for designers to create artistically designed useful articles.
Second, by considering only the design process, the proposed balancing
test ensures that copyrightability does not turn on judges' personal tastes.
The test does not incorporate other standards that are based on the work
being conceivable as art.20 5 Asking whether the product can stand alone as a
traditional work of art, or whether an imaginary ordinary observer could
conceive the product as art, invites judges to give effect to their own
preconceived notions of the nature of art. This effectively would allow them
to grant or deny protection based on their own biases and personal tastes. The
proposed balancing test does not give judges the opportunity to allow their
biases to affect the outcome. Instead, the only relevant perspective is that of
the designer. This makes copyright protection much more predictable.
Furthermore, eliminating the "traditional work of art" inquiry ensures that
works will not be precluded from protection merely because they do not fall
into the category of popular or mainstream art. Predictability of protection
and elimination of a popular art standard in turn provides more incentive for
designers to create artistically designed useful articles.
Third, because it balances both the subjective and objective elements of
the design process, the proposed balancing test provides a much needed
degree of flexibility. Unlike tests that would deny protection when the
designer considers functional concerns at all,20 6 or when a design is dictated
by function even minimally, 20 7 the proposed balancing test takes account of
the fact that utilitarian considerations and the design requirements of an
article's function will influence the design process to different degrees in
different cases.
The fact that the proposed test does not provide a bright line rule is not a
weakness, but an advantage. Separability strives to balance the protection of
artistic expression with the denial of protection for functionality. The line
between the two is not always clear. A conceptual separability test needs to
be flexible so that courts can deal successfully with those cases where the
line is not clear. Furthermore, the flexibility inherent in the proposed test
does not make the test detrimentally difficult to apply. Nor does it give
judges too much discretion and allow them to base separability
205 See supra pages 139-40 (discussing Professor Goldstein's and Judge Newman's
tests).
206 See supra pages 136-37 (discussing Professor Denicola's test, which was
adopted by the Second Circuit.in Brandir).
207 See supra pages 138-39 (discussing the Carol Barnhart test).
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determinations on improper considerations, such as their own conceptions of
art. Instead, the flexibility of the proposed test merely takes account of the
reality that a useful article's function will inevitably impact its design,
whether by influencing the designer's mental process or by requiring certain
design elements.
The separability requirement exists in order to balance the need to
protect artistic expression with the desire to deny protection to utilitarian
function.208 This dichotomy derives from the ultimate purpose of copyright
law: promoting the arts and sciences for public benefit through the
widespread dissemination of works. 20 9 Copyright law provides an author
with a limited monopoly over his or her works; thus, it encourages artistic
creation by ensuring that free-riders do not copy the author's work (which
would cause a decrease in or the possible elimination of the original author's
potential profit).210 Eliminating free-riders spurs dissemination of works by
providing an economic incentive to create. However, copyright protection
must be limited; without limits, copyright would stifle dissemination by
allowing permanent monopolies over any creation, making works less
available to the public.211 The separability doctrine is one such limit. The
doctrine creates an incentive for artistic creation by allowing for protection of
truly aesthetic designs of useful articles. At the same time, the doctrine
ensures that useful articles are widely available by denying protection to
works that are purely utilitarian. The proposed conceptual separability test
successfully balances these competing needs.
The two-factor balancing test furthers the ultimate goal of copyright law
by encouraging the widespread dissemination of works for public benefit.
Absent fair and predictable copyright protection for the design of useful
articles, designers would not have any incentive to merge the useful and the
artistic because designs could be copied freely, preventing the designer from
benefiting from his or her artistic work. This would deny the public the
benefit of a wide variety of choices. The proposed balancing test provides
208 See Note, Rethinking Copyright for Advertisements, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2486,
2501 (2006).
209 See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 57 (6th ed. 2003); see also Stephen
Langs, The Definitional Scope of an Intrinsic Utilitarian Function Under the 1976
Copyright Act: One Man's Use is Another Man's Art, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 143, 164
(1998).
2 10 See JOYCE, supra note 209, at 57 n.10 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an author's creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the public good.")).
211 See id. at 58. Joyce notes that copyright protection is limited by doctrines such as
originality, fair use, and the idea/expression dichotomy. Separability is another limiting
doctrine.
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incentives for designers to incorporate aesthetic creativity in the design of
useful articles by making protection predictable and allowing protection to
turn on the design process only. The public would stand to benefit by having
a variety of choices when it comes to useful articles, each choice having
different aesthetic qualities. The two-factor balancing test, unlike the others
discussed in this Note, properly balances the need to protect artistic
expression with the need to deny protection for utilitarian function.
VI. CONCLUSION
The merger of functional products with artistic design has caused a
tension between the interest in providing copyright protection for artistic
expression and the interest in denying protection for utilitarian function. The
separability requirement, incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976, is
Congress's attempt to resolve that tension. However, the courts have not
reached a consensus as to how to apply the separability requirement. After
the recent inconsistent Galiano and Pivot Point decisions by the Fifth and
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, both of which were written more than
twenty-five years after the 1976 Act took effect, it is clear that the debate
over conceptual separability is still alive and well. Conceptual separability is
necessary to provide copyright protection for the artistic and aesthetic
features of useful articles and deny protection to designs that are purely
functional. However, it is a difficult concept, and courts have had great
difficulty not only in defining a successful test for the doctrine, but in
reaching a consensus on which test is appropriate. This has, in turn, led to
confusion regarding the copyrightability of the designs of useful articles.
Neither the test adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Pivot Point nor the test
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Galiano provide a satisfactory line for
distinguishing between copyrightable artistic expression and uncopyrightable
utilitarian function. The Newman and Goldstein tests are not suitable
alternatives. The Carol Barnhart test, while a good start, is not, in itself,
enough to successfully balance the protection of expression with the freedom
of function.
This Note proposes an alternative, two-factor balancing test. It directs
courts to balance 1) the degree to which the designer's subjective process is
motivated by aesthetic considerations, as opposed to functional ones, and 2)
the degree to which the product's design is dictated by its utilitarian function.
The proposed test would allow protection for useful articles that truly involve
artistic expression, but would deny protection for useful articles that are
purely utilitarian in nature. The proposed test makes copyrightability more
predictable. Furthermore, the test accounts for the realities of industrial
design by allowing protection even if the design process is influenced by
functional considerations or the product design is somewhat dictated by a
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product's utilitarian function. Thus, the test accomplishes the balancing
necessary to give designers incentives to produce aesthetically motivated
useful articles. This in turn benefits the public by providing a wide variety of
choices in the designs of useful articles. The proposed balancing test is better
than the currently available tests because the proposed test successfully
balances the competing considerations of copyright protection in industrial
design and because it furthers the purposes behind American copyright law.

